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Abstract
A new model of strategic network formation is developed and analyzed, where
an agent’s investment in links is nonspeci￿c. The model comprises a large
class of games which are both potential and super- or submodular games. We
obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria with respect to invest-
ment costs for supermodular as well as submodular networking games. We
also study logit-perturbed best-response dynamics for supermodular games
with potentials. We ￿nd that the associated set of stochastically stable states
forms a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria and derive comparative
statics results for the smallest and the largest stochastically stable state. Fi-
nally, we provide a broad spectrum of applications from social interaction to
industrial organization.
￿Corresponding author. Email: haller@vt.edu
1NONSPECIFIC NETWORKING
To network or not to network,
that is the question.
1 Introduction
We develop and analyze a new model of strategic network formation where
an agent’s e￿ort or investment in links is nonspeci￿c. Models of strategic
network formation typically assume that each agent selects his direct links to
other agents in which to invest. Yet in practice, a person’s networking e￿orts
may not only establish or strengthen desirable links to speci￿c agents, but
also create or reinforce links to many if not all other individuals. Bene￿cial
links may come along with detrimental ones. For example, being better
connected and more accessible implies potentially more calls from phone
banks, more \spam", more encounters with annoying or hostile people.
Here we focus on nonspeci￿c networking, meaning that an agent can-
not select a speci￿c subset of feasible links which he wants to establish or
strengthen. Rather, each agent chooses an e￿ort level or intensity of net-
working. In the simplest case, the agent faces a binary choice: to network or
not to network. If an agent increases his networking e￿ort, all direct links to
other agents are strengthened to various degrees. We assume that bene￿ts
accrue only from direct links. The set of agents or players is ￿nite. Each
agent has a ￿nite strategy set consisting of the networking levels to choose
from. For any pair of agents, their networking levels determine the individ-
ual bene￿ts which they obtain from interacting with each other. An agent
derives an aggregate bene￿t from the pairwise interactions with all others.
This aggregate bene￿t is a function of the chosen pro￿le of networking lev-
els. In addition, the agent incurs networking costs, which are a function of
the agent’s own networking level. The agent’s payo￿ is his aggregate bene￿t
minus his cost. The set of agents together with the individual strategy sets
and payo￿ functions constitute a game in strategic form. Equilibrium means
Nash equilibrium.1
1The recent literature employs mainly two alternative equilibrium concepts | and com-
binations thereof. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced pairwise stability as solution
2Despite its apparent simplicity, our hitherto unexplored model of net-
work formation proves very promising for two reasons. First, it covers a
broad spectrum of applications. It allows for social networking where some
persons are more attractive than others, and some even possess negative at-
traction. Attraction or repulsion can be mutual or not. Certain individuals
can have greater advantages from networking or smaller costs of network-
ing than others and, therefore, may be considered natural networkers. To
the extent that bene￿ts are positive, under-investment in links can occur in
equilibrium. When one allows for the possibility that bene￿ts from inter-
actions with certain agents are negative, a player prefers not to have links
and interactions with such \bad neighbors". Therefore, agents may refrain
from networking even when link formation is costless. But an agent cannot
prevent bad neighbors from networking and, consequently, may su￿er from
their e￿orts. Thus, there can be over-investment in the sense that less in-
vestment would increase aggregate welfare. In Section 6, we shall present an
example where under-investment by one group of agents and over-investment
by a second group coexist in equilibrium. In addition to social interaction
and networking, the model is applicable in economics, in particular in the
context of industrial organization. Subsection 4D is devoted to the formation
of user networks with various degrees of compatibility across technologies.
The second reason why our model holds much promise are two classes of
very interesting games it includes. Speci￿cally, the model comprises a large
class of games which are both potential and supermodular (strategic comple-
ments) games. Finite potential games and ￿nite supermodular games have
in common that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exists. The literature
on games which share both properties is scarce. Dubey, Haimanko, and Za-
pechelnyuk (2002) show that games of strategic substitutes or complements
with aggregation are \pseudo-potential" games. 2 As a consequence, they ob-
tain existence of a Nash equilibrium and convergence to Nash equilibrium
of certain deterministic best response processes. Br^ anzei, Mallozzi and Tijs
(2003) investigate the relationship between the class of potential games and
the class of supermodular games. They essentially focus on two-person zero-
sum games (and a special case of Cournot duopoly). Their main result is
concept for strategic models of network formation. Here we follow Bala and Goyal (2000)
in adopting Nash equilibrium as solution concept.
2The notion of pseudo-potential games is a generalization of the notion of best-response
potential games introduced by Voorneveld (2000).
3that two-player zero-sum supermodular games are potential games and con-
versely that two-player zero-sum potential games can be transformed into
supermodular games. In our model, suitable assumptions on the bene￿ts
from pairwise interaction give rise to a novel class of games which are both
potential and supermodular games. A di￿erent set of assumptions generates
an equally rich family of networking games which have both a potential and
the strategic substitutes property.
In section 5, we obtain comparative statics results for Nash equilibria
with respect to networking costs for either class of networking games, those
with strategic complements and those with strategic substitutes. If a game is
a potential game as well, then perturbed best response dynamics with logit
trembles yield the maximizers of the potential as the stochastically stable
states, as shown by Blume (1993, 1997), Young (1998), Baron et al. (2002b),
among others. Logit trembles have the appealing feature that mistake proba-
bilities are state-dependent and the probability of making a speci￿c mistake,
that is of playing a speci￿c non-best response, is inversely related to the op-
portunity cost of making the mistake. 3 Furthermore, Mattsson and Weibull
(2002) and Baron et al. (2002a, 2002b) derive a logit rule as the solution of a
maximization problem involving a trade-o￿ between the magnitude of trem-
bles and control costs. The fact that the stochastically stable states are the
maximizers of the potential, has several strong implications. First, the set of
stochastically stable states is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria. Further,
in the case of supermodular games, the set of stochastically stable states
forms a sublattice of the lattice of Nash equilibria. Consequently, a symmet-
ric game has at least one symmetric stochastically stable state. Finally, again
in the case of supermodular games, one obtains comparative statics results
for the smallest and the largest stochastically stable state. The structural
properties of the set of stochastically stable states are derived in Section 3.
Comparative statics is performed in Section 5.
The investigation of logit perturbed best response dynamics for super-
modular games with potentials and the associated set of stochastically sta-
ble states is one of the original contributions of the current paper. Dubey,
Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2002) do not consider stochastic perturba-
3The most prominent alternative, Bernoulli or uniform trembles, does not have this
feature. Both types of trembles often, but not always lead to the same set of stochastically
stable states or long-run equilibria.
4tions or \noise" and stochastic stability. To our knowledge only two earlier
papers, Kandori and Rob (1995) and Kaarboe and Tieman (1999), combine
stochastic stability and supermodularity in a general setting. 4 These two
papers focus on a class of global interaction games based on two-player and
symmetric strict supermodular games. Players gradually adjust their behav-
ior in taking a summary statistic into account. The adjustment process is
perturbed by Bernoulli or uniform trembles or slight generalizations thereof.
All authors obtain monotonicity results of best responses over the set of
states and show that the limit sets of the unperturbed process correspond
one-to-one with the set of (strict) Nash equilibria of the recurrent game.
Consequently, the set of stochastically stable states is contained in the set of
Nash equilibria. Hence supermodular games exposed to uniform trembes and
potential games exposed to logit trembes both induce perturbed dynamics
under which the stochastically stable states form a subset of the set of Nash
equilibria. Unlike the present paper, the earlier literature does not examine
the structure of the set of stochastically states and its variation in response
to parametric changes.
Nonspeci￿c networking admits a di￿erential impact of an agent’s net-
working e￿orts on the strength of links to various other agents. In particular,
undirected graphs serve as a descriptive tool throughout the paper to distin-
guish between pairs of agents which can form links among themselves and
those pairs which cannot reach each other. Such a graph represents a \social
structure" in the sense of Chwe (2000). At the end of Section 4, we indi-
cate our original yet easily overlooked contribution to the nascent economic
literature on the role of social structure.
We set the stage in Section 2, where we develop the general model and
discuss some of the most pertinent issues by means of prototype case stud-
ies. In Section 3, we introduce logit perturbed best-response dynamics and
analyze the corresponding set of stochastically stable states. In Section 4, we
present pairwise symmetry conditions which guarantee existence of a poten-
tial for the networking game. This section also includes the analysis of several
classes of games which satisfy pairwise symmetry and most of which exhibit
either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. Section 5 is devoted
4Other papers on stochastic stability and supermodularity (or submodularity) exist
but they exclusively deal with symmetric aggregative games that are either submodular
or supermodular [Al￿ os-Ferrer and Ania (2002), Schipper (2003)].
5to comparative statics. In Section 6, we present two classes of games which
violate pairwise symmetry. Section 7 contains conclusions and extensions.
2 Model and Key Issues
Our model of nonspeci￿c networking constitutes a game in strategic form.
There is a ￿nite player set I = f1;:::;Ng where N > 1. Every player i 2 I
has strategy set Si = K = fk0;k1;:::;kTg, with T ￿ 1 and 0 = k0 < k1 <
::: < kT. The T + 1 individual strategies 0;k1;:::;kT are the networking
levels a player can choose and are the same for all players. Depending on
the context, a higher networking level may mean more e￿ort in socializing,
more investment in networking skills, more investment in communication and
information hardware or software, subscription to better network services.
The joint strategy space is S = S1 ￿ ::: ￿ SN, with generic elements s. The
space of joint strategies or strategy pro￿les of all players except i is denoted
S￿i =
Q
j6=i Sj, with generic elements s￿i. Players receive bene￿ts from
pairwise interaction with others:
For any pair (i;j) 2 I ￿I;i 6= j, player i receives a bene￿t bij(si;sj) 2 I R
from interacting with j, if i chooses si 2 Si and j chooses sj 2 Sj. At this
preliminary stage, the bene￿t function bij should be viewed as a reduced
form that convolutes several e￿ects. Subsequently, special cases of bene￿t
functions will be considered, where the di￿erent aspects of network formation
become more explicit and transparent. Player i 2 I incurs a cost ci(si) when
choosing si 2 Si. As a rule, the choice of a higher networking level is more
costly: 0 = ci(0) < ci(k1) < ::: < ci(kT). However, in some applications,
k0;k1;:::;kT may just be labels for di￿erent technologies, user networks,
natural or arti￿cial languages, etc. which cannot be unambiguously ranked
in terms of bene￿ts or costs. The payo￿ ui(s) for player i depends on the
strategy pro￿le (joint strategy) of all players, s = (s1;:::;sN) 2 S, and




bij(si;sj) ￿ ci(si): (1)
The list G = (I;(Si)i2I;(ui)i2I) constitutes a game in strategic or nor-
mal form and summarizes our model of nonspeci￿c networking and network
formation. The equilibrium concept is Nash equilibrium. When appropriate,
6we shall employ the concept of a potential P for G pioneered by Monderer
and Shapley (1996), i.e. a function P :S ! I R such that
ui(si;s￿i) ￿ ui(s
0
i;s￿i) = P(si;s￿i) ￿ P(s
0
i;s￿i)
for all i 2 I;si;s0
i 2 Si;s￿i 2 S￿i.
We shall further use the following terminology and notation related to





for s 2 S. A strategy pro￿le s is called e￿cient if it is a maximizer of
W and called ine￿cient otherwise. Let F = fJ ￿ I : jJj = 2g. A pair
￿ = (I;E) with E ￿ F is called an undirected graph with vertex set I
and edge set E. Then the elements of I are called the vertices or nodes of
the graph and the elements of E are called the edges or links of the graph.
In case fi;jg 2 E, i.e. in case fi;jg is an edge (link) of the graph, we also
say that fi;jg \belongs to the graph" and that i and j are \neighbors".
Throughout, without further mention, we are restricting ourselves to graphs
without isolated nodes. In such a graph, every node has at least one neighbor.
Finally, we use the shorthand notation ij for (i;j).
We are going to explore the implications of two opposite conditions on
the bene￿ts from interaction of a pair of players ij, i 6= j:
De￿nition 1 bij satis￿es decreasing di￿erences in (si;sj) 2 Si￿Sj if for
all pairs (si;sj) and (s0
i;s0
j), it is the case that si ￿ s0











bij satis￿es increasing di￿erences in (si;sj) 2 Si￿Sj if for all pairs (si;sj)
and (s0
i;s0
j), it is the case that si ￿ s0











Decreasing di￿erences is a strategic substitutes condition when a reaction
function for i exists and equivalent to @2bij=@sj@si ￿ 0 when K is an in-
terval and bij is su￿ciently smooth. Increasing di￿erences is a strategic
complements condition when a reaction function for i exists and equivalent
to @2bij=@sj@si ￿ 0 when K is an interval and bij is su￿ciently smooth.
For details and further references, see Topkis (1998) and Chapter 2 of Vives
(1999). As a ￿rst result, we obtain
7Proposition 1 Let G be a networking game where pairwise bene￿ts satisfy
the following assumption:
(A) There exists an undirected graph (without isolated nodes) (I;E) such
that bij = 0 for fi;jg 62 E and bij satis￿es increasing di￿erences in
(si;sj) 2 Si ￿ Sj for fi;jg 2 E.
Then the set of Nash equilibria SN ￿ S is nonempty and the partially ordered
set SN is a lattice.
proof. S =
Q
i2I Si is a ￿nite lattice as the cartesian product of ￿nite
lattices. For each i 2 I, ui(si;s￿i) is trivially supermodular in si on Si for
each s￿i 2 S￿i. Pick any i 2 I. For each j 6= i, ui(si;sj;s￿ij) has in-
creasing di￿erences in (si;sj) on Si ￿ Sj because of the functional form (1)
and assumption (A) which means that ui(si;s￿i) has increasing di￿erences
in (si;s￿i) on Si ￿ S￿i. Hence G is a supermodular game. The assertion
follows from Zhou’s Theorem (1994, p. 299).
The speci￿c cases examined in subsections 2C, 4B and Section 6, the case
of downward compatibility in subsection 4D, and the examples given in Sec-
tion 5 satisfy the assumptions of the proposition. If in addition, the game
is symmetric, one obtains existence of a symmetric equilibrium as a corollary.
For the remainder of this section, we are going to examine several special
cases of the model, which allows us to bring out some of its most important
features and pertinent issues. In particular, we shall address the issue of in-
e￿ciency of equilibrium outcomes. As mentioned in the Introduction, there
can be both under-investment and over-investment in links. Another inter-
esting aspect is the equilibrium investment pattern. As a rule, a symmetric
model gives rise to a symmetric equilibrium. But asymmetric equilibria can
exist as well. A further property to be investigated is stochastic stability of
equilibrium outcomes. It turns out that stochastic stability does not neces-
sarily introduce a bias in favor of the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric
game.
2A: Case of Homogeneous Player Population
We consider a homogeneous population of N = 2M players with M ￿
2. The players form a circular undirected graph ￿ = ( I;E) with E =
8ff1;2g;f2;3g;:::;fN￿1;Ng;fN;1gg. The set of available networking levels
is K = fh=2 : h = 0;1;:::;10g. The pairwise bene￿t functions are
bij(si;sj) =
q
si + sj for fi;jg 2 E; bij(si;sj) = 0 for fi;jg 62 E:
Costs are of the speci￿c linear form ci(si) = si. The corresponding game
G = (I;(Si)i2I;(ui)i2I) is symmetric and has the symmetric equilibrium
s￿ = (s￿
1;:::;s￿
N) = (1=2;:::;1=2). This equilibrium is ine￿cient, since max-
imization of the welfare function W requires that si + sj = 4 for fi;jg 2 E.
Indeed, everybody would be better o￿ at s = (2;:::;2) than at s￿. The
reason for the under-investment in equilibrium | which is characteristic for
most of the existing network formation models | is that players neglect the
positive externality that their investment creates for their neighbors.
G has at least two asymmetric equilibria, s4 = (0;1;0;1;:::;0;1) and
sr = (1;0;1;0;:::;1;0).5 All three equilibria are ine￿cient, with the same
value W = 2N ￿ M whereas the maximum value of W is 4N ￿ 2N = 2N.
The game has a potential P given by (3) below. All three equilibria are
maximizers of P, and therefore stochastically stable states with respect to
best response dynamics with logit perturbations, as studied by Blume (1993,
1997), Young (1998), and Baron et al. (2002a, b), among others. Conse-
quently, under very small random perturbations, asymmetric outcomes are
more likely (since they outnumber the symmetric one) than the symmetric
equilibrium.6 While there may be a preference for concentrating on symmet-
ric equilibria because of analytical convenience, our analysis suggests that
the symmetric equilibrium is not necessarily the predominant outcome. To
recapitulate, the main features of this particular case with a homogeneous
player population are:
(a) Existence of symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
(b) Under-investment in equilibrium.
(c) Stochastic stability of symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
Co-existence of symmetric and asymmetric equilibria and under-investment
can be expected in many other cases with homogeneous player populations.
5For M = 2, these are obviously the only other equilibria. For M > 2, there exist also
equilibria with strings 1=2;1;0;1;1=2.
6For details, see Section 3.
9The stochastic stability result (c) seems to be less robust: In subsection 4D,
we refer to a numerical example in Baron et al. (2002a, p. 574) where
stochastic stability rules out all symmetric equilibria.
2B: Case of Variably Attractive Players
Like in the previous case, we consider a population of N = 2M;M ￿
2 players, which form a circular undirected graph ￿ = ( I;E) with E =
ff1;2g;f2;3g;:::;fN ￿ 1;Ng;fN;1gg. As before, the set of available net-
working levels is K = fh=2 : h = 0;1;:::;10g and the costs functions are
ci(si) = si. But the population is no longer homogeneous with respect
to bene￿ts. We assume that the even numbered players i = 2;4;:::;2M
are more attractive to their neighbors than the odd numbered players j =
1;3;:::;2M ￿ 1. Speci￿cally, the pairwise bene￿t functions are now:
bij(si;sj) =
q
si + sj for fi;jg 2 E;i even;
bij(si;sj) = 2 ￿
q
si + sj for fi;jg 2 E;i odd;
bij(si;sj) = 0 for fi;jg 62 E:
Hence, ceteris paribus, it is more bene￿cial for an odd numbered player to
interact with his two even numbered neighbors than for an even numbered
player to interact with her two odd numbered neighbors. As before, for an
even numbered player, a best response si against any s￿i 2 S￿i satis￿es
si ￿ 1. But now if j is an odd numbered player, s￿j 2 S￿j where every
even numbered i plays si ￿ 1, and sj 2 Sj is a best response against s￿j,
then sj ￿ 3. In turn, if i is an even numbered player, s￿i 2 S￿i where
every odd numbered j plays sj ￿ 3, and si 2 Si is a best response against
s￿i, then si = 0. Finally, if j is an odd numbered player, s￿j 2 S￿j where
every even numbered i plays si = 0, and sj 2 Sj is a best response against
s￿j, then sj = 4. These best response properties of the game imply that
s￿￿ = (4;0;4;0;:::;4;0) is the unique equilibrium and that the singleton
fs￿￿g is the only minimal set closed under asynchronous best replies (min-
imal cuabr set) in the sense of Baron et al. (2002a). By Proposition 1 of
Baron et al. (2002a), s￿￿ is the only stochastically stable state with respect
to best response dynamics with logit perturbations. The strategy pro￿le s￿￿
emerges as the only equilibrium and stochastically stable outcome, because
10interaction is very bene￿cial for odd numbered players. The odd numbered
players make a substantial investment in networking, which is much higher
than their investment in the corresponding asymmetric equilibrium sr of the
homogeneous player case 2A. Now the even numbered players enjoy a guaran-
teed and larger free ride because of their attractiveness. Still, there is under-
investment in networking: W(s￿￿) = 8M whereas s = (5;0;5;0;:::;5;0)
yields W(s) ￿ 8:41M. However, the associated welfare gain can only bene￿t
all players, if side-payments are possible.
2C: Case of Good and Bad Neighbors
Again, we consider a population of N = 2M;M ￿ 2 players and the circular
undirected graph ￿ = (I;E) with E = ff1;2g;f2;3g;:::;fN￿1;Ng;fN;1gg.
As before, the set of available networking levels is K = fh=2 : h = 0;1;:::;10g
and the cost functions are ci(si) = si. As in case 2B, the population is
heterogeneous with respect to bene￿ts. But now we assume that the even
numbered players i = 2;4;:::;2M are \good neighbors" whereas the odd
numbered players j = 1;3;:::;2M ￿1 are \bad neighbors". Speci￿cally, the
pairwise bene￿t functions are now:
bij(si;sj) = ￿4(si + sj) for fi;jg 2 E;i even;
bij(si;sj) = 2(si + sj) for fi;jg 2 E;i odd;
bij(si;sj) = 0 for fi;jg 62 E:
Under these circumstances, an even numbered player i wants to minimize
interaction with her bad neighbors and has the strictly dominant strategy
si = 0 while an odd numbered player j prefers to maximize interaction with
his good neighbors and has the strictly dominant strategy sj = 5. Conse-
quently, s+ = (5;0;5;0;:::;5;0) is the equilibrium point in strictly domi-
nant strategies and fs+g is the unique minimal cuabr set. By Proposition
1 of Baron et al. (2002a), s+ is the only stochastically stable state with
respect to best response dynamics with logit perturbations. The extremely
stable outcome s+ represents an instance of over-investment in networking:
W is maximized at s = (0;0;:::;0;0). Yet in equilibrium, the even num-
bered \good neighbors" refrain from networking, but cannot prevent their
odd numbered \bad neighbors" from making heavy investments. Everybody
could be made better o￿, if the even numbered players were able to compen-
sate their neighbors for abstention from networking.
113 Stochastic Stability
Our concept of stochastic stability is based upon best response dynamics with
logit perturbations. Throughout, we consider dynamics with asynchronous
updating and persistent noise, with discrete time t = 0;1;::: and states
s 2 S. Let q = (q1;:::;qn) ￿ 0 be an n-dimensional probability vector.
The recurrent game G is played once in each period. In each period t, one
player, say i, is drawn with probability qi > 0 from this population to adjust
his strategy and does so according to a perturbed adaptive rule. The non-
selected players repeat the strategies they have played in the previous period.
The perturbed adaptive rule is a logit rule. Suppose the current state is
s = (sj)j2I. In principle, the updating player i wants to play a best reply
against s￿i = (sj)j6=i. But with some small probability, the player trembles
and plays a non-best reply. If the player follows a logit rule, then for all








where ￿ > 0 is a noise parameter. For given ￿, two choices that yield the
same payo￿ to i are equally likely. If one of them yields a higher payo￿,
it will be chosen with a higher probability. In particular, any best reply
to s￿i is more likely to be chosen than a non-best reply. As ￿ ! 0, the
probability that a best reply is chosen goes to 1. For given ￿ > 0, one obtains
a stationary Markov process on S with transition matrix M(￿). M(￿) has
entries ms;s0(￿) 2 S ￿ S with the following properties. If s and s0 di￿er in
more than one component, then ms;s0(￿) = 0. If s and s0 di￿er only in the
ith coordinate and s0 = (ti;s￿i), then ms;s0(￿) = qi ￿ p
ti
i (s). If s = s0, then
ms;s(￿) =
P
j2I qj ￿ p
sj
j (s). The process is irreducible and aperiodic, hence
it is ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution, represented by a row
probability vector ￿(￿). Like in many prior studies of perturbed evolutionary
games we want to determine the behavior of the system when ￿ ! 0, that is
when the noise becomes arbitrarily small. If the limit stationary distribution
￿￿ = lim￿!0 ￿(￿) exists, we write S￿ for its support:
S
￿ ￿ fs 2 S : ￿
￿
s > 0g
12The pro￿les in S￿ will be referred to as stochastically stable states. These
are the states in which the system stays most of the time when very little,
but still some noise remains. Baron et al. (2002a) show that S￿ can be
partitioned into minimal sets closed under asynchronous best replies. It
turns out that the limit stationary distribution exists and the stochastically
stable states are the maximizers of the potential, if the underlying game G
has a potential.
Proposition 2 If G has a potential P, then S￿ = argmaxs2S P(s) and all
stochastically stable states have equal probability.
proof. See Blume (1993, 1997), Young (1998), Baron et al. (2002a,b) for
the key argument.
A further immediate implication is given by
Proposition 3 If G has a potential P, then argmaxs2S P(s) is a non-empty
set of Nash equilibria.
proof. Since G is a ￿nite game, there exists s 2 S which maximizes P.
Every maximizer of P is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Moreover, for a potential game which satis￿es assumption (A) of Proposition
1, the set of stochastically stable states forms a nonempty sublattice of the
equilibrium set SN. For the de￿nition and characterization of supermodular
functions, see Topkis (1998).
Proposition 4 Suppose G is a networking game which has a potential
P :S ! I R and satis￿es (A). Then:
(￿) The potential P is supermodular on S.
(￿) S￿ is a nonempty sublattice of SN.
Remark. Observe that if in addition, G is a symmetric game, then as-
sertion (￿) of the proposition implies that G has at least one symmet-
ric stochastically stable state. The result that the set of stochastically
stable state forms a nonempty sublattice of S (rather than merely a lat-
tice), is also of some practical interest. Namely, then one can easily ￿nd
13a new stochastically stable state knowing that two pro￿les (equilibria) are
stochastically stable: If s = (s1;:::;sN) and s0 = (s0
1;:::;s0
N) are in S￿,
then so are supSfs;s0g = (maxfs1;s0
1g;:::;maxfsN;s0
Ng) and infSfs;s0g =
(minfs1;s0
1g;:::;minfsN;s0
Ng). One cannot necessarily proceed this way
within the equilibrium set SN. For the conclusion of Proposition 1 that
the set of Nash equilibria SN is a nonempty lattice can be hardly replaced by
the stronger assertion that SN is a sublattice of the set of strategy pro￿les
S. The reason is that Zhou’s Fixed-Point Theorem (1994, p. 297) cannot be
generalized to show the set of ￿xed points of an increasing correspondence
from a nonempty complete lattice X into itself to be a sublattice of X; see
Zhou (1994, p. 298) and Example 2.5.1 of Topkis (1998, p. 40). For the spe-
ci￿c case of a two-player supermodular game where players’ strategy sets are
totally ordered, Echenique (2003) establishes that the set of Nash equilibria
is a sublattice of the set of strategy pro￿les. But he observes that a super-
modular game with more than two players need not have an equilibrium set
that is a sublattice even if players’ strategy sets are totally ordered.
proof. (￿): Pick any i 2 I. For all j 6= i and for all s;s0 2 S such that
si ￿ s0






















The two equalities follow from the de￿nition of a potential P. The inequality
follows from (A). This means that P has increasing di￿erences on Si ￿ Sj
for each j 6= i. As this property holds for all i 2 I, we conclude that P
has increasing di￿erences on S. Assertion (￿) follows from Corollary 2.6.1 in
Topkis (1998).
(￿): By Proposition 2, the set of stochastically stable states S￿ is the set
of maximizers of P. Because S is a ￿nite set, S￿ is nonempty. By (￿) and
Theorem 2.7.1 of Topkis (1998), S￿ is a sublattice of S. Moreover, by Propo-
sition 1, SN is a lattice. Now S￿ ￿ SN by Proposition 3. Thus we have that
S￿ ￿ SN ￿ S and S￿ is a sublattice of SN.
14Remark. The results contained in Propositions 1 and 4 do not depend on
the particular form of the payo￿ functions (1). They hold if the ￿nite game
G = (I;(Si)i2I;(ui)i2I) satis￿es the following set of conditions:
(X1) For each i 2 I, Si is a ￿nite subset of I R.
(X2) For each i 2 I, ui : Si ￿ S￿i ! I R has increasing di￿erences in (si;s￿i)
on Si ￿ S￿i.
(X3) G is a potential game with potential P : S ! I R.
One can draw stronger conclusions if (X2) is replaced by the stronger condi-
tion that for each i 2 I, ui : S ! I R is supermodular on S:
Proposition 5 Assume (X1), (X3), and supermodularity of all ui;i 2 I.
Then the set of states s 2 S which are both e￿cient and stochastically stable
is a sublattice of S.
proof. Because the payo￿ function ui is supermodular on S for each i 2 I,
the utilitarian welfare function W is supermodular on S as the ￿nite sum
of supermodular functions by Lemma 2.6.1 in Topkis (1998). It follows that
S1 = argmaxs2S W(s) is a sublattice of S by Theorem 2.7.1 from Topkis
(1998). Now the set of states which are both e￿cient and stochastically sta-
ble is de￿ned by S1 \S￿. Because S￿ is a sublattice of S by the generalized
version of Proposition 4, S1 \S￿ is the sublattice of S as the intersection of
sublattices of S by Lemma 2.2.2 from Topkis (1998).
Remark. Note that Proposition 5 does not assert that S1\S￿ is nonempty.
Consider the well known class of coordination games: I = f1;2g, S1 =
S2 = f0;1g, and u1(0;1) = u2(1;0) = b, u1(1;1) = u2(1;1) = d, u1(0;0) =
u2(0;0) = a, u1(1;0) = u2(0;1) = c, where a > c, d > b, a < d and
(a ￿ c) > (d ￿ b). Here P(s) = (a ￿ c)(1 ￿ maxfs1;s2g) + (d ￿ b)s1s2, and
we see that S￿ = f(0;0)g, S1 = f(1;1)g.
4 Pairwise Symmetry
In this section, we explore the implications of su￿ciently strong restrictions
on the pairwise bene￿t functions which render the networking game G a po-
tential game. Suppose that indeed, G has a potential P. Then the most
15important implications are given by Propositions 2 and 3: Stochastic sta-
bility selects a subset of Nash equilibria of a potential game. Under fur-
ther assumptions, the set of stochastically stable states forms a lattice. But
which restrictions on bene￿t functions would yield a potential game? To
this end, let us consider for any pair of distinct players ij, the two-player
game Gij with player set Iij = fi;jg, strategy sets Si = Sj = K, and pay-
o￿s bij(si;sj) for i and bji(sj;si) for j when they play the joint strategy
(si;sj) 2 K ￿ K. Suppose ￿ij is a potential for Gij. We say that ￿ij is
symmetric, if ￿ij(si;sj) = ￿ij(sj;si) for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿K. Existence of a
symmetric potential for all pairwise interactions is su￿cient for the existence
of a potential of the entire networking game:
Proposition 6 If for each distinct pair ij, ￿ij is a symmetric potential of












for s 2 S, is a potential of G.
proof. Analogous to proof of Proposition 1 in Baron et al. (2002b).
Next we impose directly certain restrictions on the pairwise bene￿t func-
tions and discuss how they relate to the existence of symmetric potentials.
For any distinct pair of players ij, we consider the following three condi-
tions:
(I) Identical Bene￿ts: bij(si;sj) = bji(sj;si) for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
(II) Symmetric Bene￿ts: bij(si;sj) = bji(si;sj) for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
(III) Interchangeable Actions: bij(si;sj) = bij(sj;si), bji(si;sj) = bji(sj;si)
for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
Condition (I) is tantamount to bij being a (not necessarily symmetric) po-
tential of Gij and bji being a (not necessarily symmetric) potential of Gji.
Condition (II) implies existence of a symmetric potential of Gij in case T = 1,
but not otherwise. Conditions (I) and (II) combined are equivalent to bij = bji
being a symmetric potential of Gij. Any two of the three conditions imply
the third one. As an immediate consequence of the foregoing propositions,
we obtain
16Corollary 1 If any two of the conditions (I){(III) hold, then the game G
has a potential P of the form (3) with ￿ij = bij and the maximizers of P are
Nash equilibria and the stochastically stable states.
While obviously restrictive, existence of a symmetric potential for Gij still
leaves a lot of ￿exibility in terms of functional form and interpretation. To
illustrate the scope of applications, let us specialize and assume that
bij(si;sj) = ￿ij(si;sj) ￿ vij; (4)
where ￿ij ￿ 0 is the probability or intensity of i interacting with j and vij
is i’s bene￿t, appreciation or valuation of an interaction with j. We can
normalize so that ￿ij ￿ 1 and ￿ij can be interpreted as a probability, but for
computational convenience will not always do so. If 0 ￿ ￿ij ￿ 1 and ￿ij is
interpreted as a probability, then player i receives bene￿t vij with probability
￿ij, zero bene￿t with probability 1￿￿ij, and expected bene￿t bij. It is possible
that players are linked without any e￿ort or investment, that is ￿ij(0;0) > 0.
It is also possible that the strength or probability of certain links proves
irresponsive to e￿ort or investment, that is ￿ij is constant. (I){(III) have the
following counter-parts:
(i) Identity: ￿ij(si;sj) = ￿ji(sj;si) for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
(ii) Symmetry: ￿ij(si;sj) = ￿ji(si;sj) for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
(iii) Interchangeability: ￿ij(si;sj) = ￿ij(sj;si), ￿ji(si;sj) = ￿ji(sj;si) for
all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
We also consider a symmetry condition for the valuations vij,
(iv) Mutual A￿nity: vij = vji.
Mutual a￿nity can result, e.g., from similarity (kindred spirits) or from com-
plementarity (attraction of opposites). There can be mutual lack of interest,
vij = vji = 0, and mutual dislike or disadvantage, vij = vji < 0. Any
two of the conditions (i){(iii) imply the third one. Conditions (i){(iv) imply
(I){(III).
For the remainder of the section, we specialize further and investigate
several interesting cases.
174A: Homogeneity and Regularity
Case 2A can be generalized as follows. First, there exists a positive integer
r ￿ N ￿ 1 such that the population I forms an r-regular graph ￿ = (I;E),
i.e. an undirected graph where every player i 2 I has r neighbors. In an
abstract sense, this re￿ects spatial homogeneity of the player population.
Next, we assume a corresponding homogeneity of pairwise bene￿ts. Namely,
there exists a C2-function B : I R+ ! I R+ with B(0) = 0;B0 > 0;B00 < 0 such
that for any pair ij and networking levels si;sj 2 K: ￿ij(si;sj) = B(si + sj)
if fi;jg 2 E and ￿ij = 0 if fi;jg 62 E. Finally, we assume uniform mutual
a￿nity across players: There exists v > 0 such that vij = vji = v for any
distinct pair ij. Then (i){(iv) are satis￿ed. Furthermore, if costs are of
the linear form ci(si) = C￿si, then for a wide range of speci￿cations of this
particular model, the three main results (a){(c) of case 2A obtain.
4B: Mutual Sympathy or Antipathy
Sympathy or antipathy among people need not be mutual, but often they are
and here we assume that they are. We consider pairwise bene￿ts of the form
(4) and concentrate on the simplest special case ￿ij(si;sj) = B(si + sj) =
si+sj. In addition, we postulate the mutual a￿nity condition (iv) and linear
networking cost functions, ci(si) = Ci￿si, with Ci > 0 for all i 2 I. Then
conditions (i){(iv) hold. Finally, we assume that players make binary choices,
to network, si = 1, or not to network, si = 0. Accordingly, K = f0;1g.
To analyze the speci￿c game G, de￿ne Wi ￿
P
j6=i vij for i 2 I. Each
player i has weakly dominant strategies. Namely, the player’s best responses
are 1 if Wi ￿ Ci > 0; 0 if Wi ￿ Ci < 0; 0 and 1 if Wi = Ci:
A player’s decision creates the surplus (2Wi￿Ci)si. Hence a player’s best
response is ine￿cient in two instances, if Wi = Ci and the player chooses si =
0 and if Wi < Ci < 2Wi. Therefore, ine￿ciencies always constitute under-









In particular, all equilibria are stochastically stable. Depending on model
parameters and tie-breaking, equilibria may be e￿cient or ine￿cient.
18Now mutual a￿nity allows for mutual lack of interest, vij = vji = 0
and mutual dislike, disadvantage, animosity, antipathy, enmity, or hostility,
vij = vji < 0. Let us consider an example of four players where each has
two friends and one enemy. Speci￿cally, N = 4 and Ci = 1:5 for all i. We
assume vij = vji = 1 for ij = 12;23;34;41 and vij = vji = ￿1 for ij = 13;24.
Mutual a￿nity can also be indicated by means of the following diagram
2 , 3
m & % . - m
1 , 4
where a link , signi￿es friendship, in which case vij = 1 for the two players,
and a link $ signi￿es negative a￿nity, in which case vij = ￿1 for the two
players. In this game, Wi = 1 for all players. s0 = (0;0;0;0) is the unique
equilibrium and stochastically stable outcome whereas s1 = (1;1;1;1) is the
e￿cient outcome. Obviously, a￿nities and adversities can give rise to a
host of interesting social spill-overs, where a player is a￿ected by a￿nities
between other players. We con￿ne ourselves to one more instructive example.
\The enemy of my enemy is my friend" usually means that if j is i’s
enemy and k is j’s enemy, then i and k might form an alliance against j.
Yet in the present situation, i may bene￿t from hostility between j and k in
a di￿erent way: If i and j are enemies, vij < 0, then i prefers that j is not
networking. This is certainly the case if vjk < 0 for all k, that is if j has
only enemies. For instance, let N = 3, v12 = v21 < 0, and v13 = 0. Then 1
prefers that 2 is not networking. This is guaranteed if W2 = v23 + v21 < C2.
Since v21 < 0 the latter holds if 2 and 3 are enemies, v23 < 0, or not too close
friends, 0 ￿ v23 < jv21j + C2.
4C: Networkers and Networking
Both in traditional and in electronic interactions, some agents are much
more active in networking than others and might be called \networkers". A
networker is more eager than others to form and utilize networks because
of (actual or perceived) bene￿t or cost advantages. The homogeneous case
4A represents a model without distinguished networkers. This model can
be modi￿ed in several ways to di￿erentiate between networkers and other
agents. Three major modelling options are the following:
19(￿) There exist numbers vi > 0, i 2 I, which are not all equal and such
that vij = vi for any distinct pair ij.
(￿￿) There exist numbers vi > 0, i 2 I, which are not all equal and such
that vij = vivj for any distinct pair ij.
(￿￿￿) There exist numbers Ci ￿ 0, which are not all equal and such that
ci(si) = Ci￿si for i 2 I;si 2 Si.
Option (￿) means that i has a greater incentive to network than j if vi > vj,
since i’s bene￿t from any interaction is higher than j’s. This option violates
the mutual a￿nity condition (iv). Consequently, G need not be a potential
game. For the sake of staying within the current framework, we will not
pursue this option any further. Notice, however, that ( ￿) yields a weighted
potential for G, a generalization dealt with in Baron et al. (2002b).
Option (￿￿) means that if vi > vj and n 2 I n fi;jg, then vin > vjn
and vni > vnj. Not only has i a higher bene￿t from any interaction and,
therefore, a greater incentive to network than j. It is also the case that
any third player n would have a higher bene￿t from interacting with i than
from interacting with j. In some cases this implies that being surrounded
by networkers, i.e. players with high vi, may induce a player to make a
large networking e￿ort. Hence, under certain circumstances, the presence
of networkers fosters networking by networkers and others. To illustrate
this possibility, let N = 2M;M ￿ 2, and ￿ = (I;E) be the circular undi-
rected graph with E = ff1;2g;f2;3g;:::;fN ￿ 1;Ng;fN;1gg. Moreover,
let K = fh=2 : h = 0;1;:::;10g and B(x) =
p
x for x 2 I R+. Finally, let
ci(si) = si. If vi = 1 for all i 2 I, then the homogeneous case 2A obtains.
Now suppose vi = 2 for i odd and vj = 1 for j even. Then the odd num-
bered players may be called networkers. Now it happens that vij = 2 for all
fi;jg 2 E. Hence in this particular instance, the introduction of networkers
has the same e￿ect as doubling everybody’s bene￿t. The modi￿ed game has
the symmetric equilibrium t￿ = (2;:::;2) which is ine￿cient and stochas-
tically stable. Like in case 2A, stochastically stable asymmetric equilibria
also exist, such as (1;3;:::;1;3);(0;4;:::;0;4), etc. Comparison of t￿ with
the symmetric equilibrium s￿ in case 2A (and of other corresponding pairs of
equilibria) demonstrates that the presence of networkers can induce others
20to increase their networking e￿orts.
Option (￿￿￿) means that some individuals have a cost advantage which
may induce them to invest more in networks and in turn may cause re-
duced networking e￿orts by others. Let us depart again from the benchmark
case 2A. Now consider the modi￿cation where still vi = 1 for all i, but
ci(si) = (1=2)￿si for i odd and cj(sj) = sj for j even. Then the odd numbered
players have a cost advantage and are the networkers. After doubling the
payo￿s of odd numbered players, this speci￿c model is identical to case 2B.
In equilibrium, the odd numbered players make a substantial investment in
networking whereas the even numbered players make none. This striking re-
sult, that only networkers invest, is primarily due to the fact that networkers
and non-networkers alternate on the circular graph. To obtain the opposite,
let us consider the following
Example. N = 4, E = ff1;2g;f2;3g;f3;4g;f4;1gg, K = f0;1;:::;Tg,
B(x) =
p
x for x 2 I R+. Put v1 = v2 = 1;v3 = v4 = R where R is an
odd integer such that 1 < R and R2(R + 1)2 ￿ 4T. Put ci(si) = si for
i = 1;2;3; si 2 Si and c4(s4) = 2s4 for s4 2 S4. Then players 3 and 4 are
the networkers in terms of bene￿ts, but player 4 is somewhat handicapped
by a cost disadvantage. Now suppose that s2 = s4 = 0. Then the best
responses s1 and s3 by 1 and 3, respectively, are given by
p
s1 = (R + 1)=2
and
p
s3 = R(R + 1)=2. Player 2 would not invest more on his own than
his neighbors’ best responses. Hence s2 = 0 is optimal against the given
values of s1 and s3. It remains to consider player 4. If 4 keeps s4 = 0, his
payo￿ is u4(0;s￿4) = R
p
s1+R2p













s3))￿2. Hence the marginal bene￿t is R=(R+1)+R2=(R(R+1)) < 2
whereas the marginal cost is 2. Since B is strictly concave, it follows that
s4 = 0 is 4’s best response against s1 and s3 given above. Therefore, s =
((R + 1)2=4;0;R2(R + 1)2=4;0) is an equilibrium where the unhandicapped
networker and one of the non-networkers invest. When R is large, the bulk
of the investment is shouldered by the networker.
214D: User Networks
Here the player set I is interpreted as a ￿nite population of users or adopters.
Each player has to adopt exactly one technology or network good from the list
K. K may consist of computer systems, word processors, internet providers,
etc. The adopters of the same good constitute a user network. Here we con-
sider the case where a user’s bene￿t stems from pairwise interactions with his
neighbors. Accordingly, the population I forms an undirected graph (I;E).
We restrict ourselves to the case of uniform mutual a￿nity across players,
vij = vji = 1 for all ij. We examine three distinct cases of compatibility of
di￿erent technologies: partial but imperfect compatibility; perfect incompat-
ibility; and downward compatibility.
partial but imperfect compatibility. We allow for partial, but
not perfect compatibility of di￿erent technologies: ￿ij(si;sj) > ￿ij(si;s0
j) if
fi;jg 2 E and sj = si and s0
j 6= si. It is plausible to assume that the
symmetry condition (ii) holds. It is unlikely that (i) or (iii) hold. But then, in
general, the game G with payo￿ function (1) is not a potential game. G does
become a potential game under the following more restrictive assumption:
There exist numbers ￿k and ￿k for k 2 K such that ￿k > ￿‘ ￿ 0 for k 6= ‘
and
￿ij(si;sj) = ￿k if si = sj = k; fi;jg 2 E;
￿ij(si;sj) = ￿‘ if si 6= sj = ‘; fi;jg 2 E;
￿ij(si;sj) = 0 if fi;jg 62 E:
￿‘ > 0 means partial but imperfect compatibility. In case E = F,
the game G is symmetric. Baron et al. (2002a, p. 574) provide a numer-
ical speci￿cation of this case where G has N symmetric equilibria and a
single asymmetric one. For certain parameter constellations, the asymmet-
ric equilibrium is the unique stochastically stable state | which shows that
stochastic stability can have bite as equilibrium selection criterion and may
work against the symmetric outcomes.
perfect incompatibility. Two prominent classes of spatial games,
both analyzed in detail in Baron et al. (2002b, pp. 555-557), permit a novel
interpretation as user network formation games. The ￿rst class consists of
22coordination games. There exist numbers 0 < e0 < e1 < ::: < eT such
that bij(si;sj) = ek if fi;jg 2 E and si = sj = k and bij(si;sj) = 0 if
fi;jg 62 E or si 6= sj. In terms of user networks, this constitutes the case
of perfect incompatibility. Conditions (I){(III) are met. Let us proceed
with the particular case where all technologies cost the same to each user,
that is the cost functions ci are constant. Then G has T + 1 symmetric
equilibria sk = (k;:::;k);k 2 K which are Pareto-ranked. sT is the Pareto-
or payo￿- dominant equilibrium and the unique stochastically stable state.
These conclusions persist as long as the cost functions vary su￿ciently little.
As an alternative, let us consider another particular case where again the
cost functions ci are constant or of su￿ciently small variation, but now there
is an extra usage cost for each pairwise interaction: There exist numbers
z0 < z1 < ::: < zT such that
bij(si;sj) = ek ￿ zk if fi;jg 2 E and si = sj = k;
bij(si;sj) = ￿zk if fi;jg 2 E and k = si 6= sj;
bij(si;sj) = 0 if fi;jg 62 E.
The extra usage cost can result from the fact that many technologies are
bundled and come along with various (in)conveniences of usage. The extra
usage cost can also represent the variable component of a two-part pricing
scheme, a frequent feature of service fee schedules. The resulting games
Gij satisfy (I) but not (II) and (III), yet still have symmetric potentials. If
e0￿z0 < e1￿z1 < ::: < eT￿zT, and e0￿2z0 > e1￿2z1 > ::: > eT￿2zT, then
again s0;:::;sT are symmetric equilibria of G and sT is Pareto-dominant.
However, now s0 is the stochastically stable equilibrium. This demonstrates
that stochastic stability may, but need not select the Pareto-dominant out-
come. Rather risk dominance plays a crucial role.
downward compatibility. The second class of spatial games is based
upon minimum e￿ort coordination games, with kh = h+1 and bij(si;sj) =
minfsi;sjg if fi;jg 2 E and bij(si;sj) = 0 if fi;jg 62 E. In terms of user net-
works, they form a case of downward compatibility. For instance, down-
ward compatibility occurs when the slowest modem determines the speed
of transmission or when the oldest and least sophisticated software version
determines which applications can be shared. This model satis￿es (I){(III).
Put ￿ ￿ jEj=N. Now suppose that ci(k) = c ￿ k for all i 2 I;k 2 K. Then
the associated potential (3) is maximized at s0 if c > ￿ and is maximized
at sT if c < ￿. Hence most of the time, the players coordinate on a speci￿c
23technology, but the select technology proves sensitive to who interacts with
whom. The ratio ￿ can be viewed as a connectivity index of the pre-existing
physical infrastructure or social fabric underlying E. Higher connectivity
tends to sustain the more advanced or upscale technology while a cost in-
crease tends to favor the basic technology. For instance, let c = 1:5 and
N > 2. If E = F, then ￿ = N ￿ 1 > c and k = kT prevails. If the graph is
circular, then ￿ = 1 < c and k = k0 prevails. Of course, if c > N ￿ 1, then
k = k0 prevails regardless of E. Alternatively, let us consider the particular
case where c = 0 so that c < ￿ would hold, but there is an extra usage cost
zk = z￿k for each of a player’s pairwise interactions by means of technology
k 2 K. If z 2 (1=2;1), then s0 turns out to be the unique stochastically
stable state regardless of E. Let us add that all technologies k or rather all
equilibria sk;k 2 K, are equally likely if c = ￿ and z = 0. This happens, for
example, when N = 4, E = F, c = 1:5, z = 0.
Notice that E constitutes a \social structure" in the sense of Chwe (2000).
Chwe investigates which social structures are conducive to coordination in a
\local information game". In contrast to Chwe’s, our model falls under the
rubric of \local interaction games". Our concern is not whether people coor-
dinate, but on which action (technology) they coordinate. Still, like Chwe we
￿nd that social structure matters: Higher connectivity favors coordination
on the more advanced technology.
5 Comparative Statics in Networking Costs
Intuitively, one would expect that networking activities intensify if network-
ing costs decline. This conjecture proves at least partially true in the presence
of strategic substitutes in pairwise interactions. To be precise, consider the
following three additional assumptions:
(B) There exists an undirected graph (without isolated nodes) ( I;E) such
that bij = 0 for fi;jg 62 E and bij satis￿es decreasing di￿erences in
(si;sj) 2 Si ￿ Sj for fi;jg 2 E.
(C) There exist C1 ￿ 0;:::;CN ￿ 0 such that ci(si) = Ci￿si for i 2 I,
si 2 Si.
(D) For i 2 I, there exists a unique best response against each s￿i 2 S￿i.
24Condition (B) constitutes the antithesis of condition (A). It is satis￿ed by
the model speci￿cations in 2A, 2B, 4A, and the example in 4C. Both (A)
and (B) hold for the linear model of 2C, 4B, and Section 6. Only condition
(A) holds in the case of downward compatibility in subsection 4D, and in
the examples given later in this section. Neither condition holds when the
user networks of subsection 4D exhibit partial but imperfect compatibility
or perfect incompatibility.
Proposition 7 Let G be a networking game satisfying (B)-(D) and let G0
be a second networking game that di￿ers from G only in the marginal net-
working costs, which are C0
1 > 0;:::;C0
N > 0 in G0. Further, let s 2 S be an
equilibrium of G and s0 2 S be an equilibrium of G0. Suppose C0
i ￿ Ci for all
i and s0 6= s. Then s0
i > si for some i.
proof. Let G;G0;C1;:::;CN;C0
1;:::;C0
N;s;s0 be as hypothesized. Since
s 6= s0, there is i 2 I such that si 6= s0
i. Consider this player i and suppose
the conclusion is false, that is s0




















































































a contradiction. The ￿rst inequality follows from optimality of si at s￿i,
si 6= s0
i, and (D). The second inequality follows from (B). The third inequal-
ity is a consequence of C0
i ￿ Ci. The last inequality follows from optimality
of s0
i at s0
￿i, si 6= s0
i, and (D). Hence, to the contrary, the conclusion has to
be true.
The assumption (D) of unique best responses can be disposed of if one pos-
tulates strict cost reductions instead:
25Proposition 8 Let G be a networking game that satis￿es (B) and (C) and
let G0 be a second networking game that di￿ers from G only in the marginal
networking costs, which are C0
1 > 0;:::;C0
N > 0 in G0. Further, let s 2 S be
an equilibrium of G and s0 2 S be an equilibrium of G0. Suppose C0
i < Ci for
all i and s0 6= s. Then s0
i > si for some i.
proof. Let G;G0;C1;:::;CN;C0
1;:::;C0
N;s;s0 be as hypothesized. Suppose
the conclusion is false, that is s0
i ￿ si for all i 2 I. Now take any i 2 I. By
assumption, si is a best response of i against s￿i in G. Since s0
j ￿ sj for all
j 6= i and (B) and (C) hold, the largest best response b si of i against s0
￿i in G
satis￿es b si ￿ si. Since C0
i < Ci, (B) and (C) hold, and G and G0 di￿er only
in marginal networking costs, one obtains e si ￿ b si for any best response e si of
i against s0
￿i in G0 and any best response b si of i against s0
￿i in G. It follows
that s0
i ￿ si because s0
i is a best response of i against s0
￿i in G0. But s0
i ￿ si
and s0
i ￿ si imply s0
i = si. Since i was arbitrary, s0 = s, which contradicts
the hypothesis of the proposition. Hence, to the contrary, the conclusion has
to be true.
Notice that the conclusion of Propositions 7 and 8 cannot be substantially
strengthened for two reasons. For one, G and G0 may have the same equilib-
ria, even if C0
i < Ci for all i. This follows from the discreteness of the model.
Secondly, let G be the game of case 2A which satis￿es (B){(D) with Ci = 1
for all i. Let G0 be a game that di￿ers from G only with respect to marginal
networking costs. Speci￿cally, set C0
i = 1=2 for i odd and C0
j = C0 < 1 for j
even. If C0 is su￿ciently close to 1, then the argument given under option
(￿￿￿) in subsection 4C still applies: s￿￿ = (4;0;:::;4;0) is an equilibrium of
G0 while s￿ = (2;2;:::;2;2) is an equilibrium of G. Obviously s￿￿ 6= s￿. But
some players have lowered their e￿orts in s￿￿ relative to s￿.
Without a strategic substitutes assumption, a cost decline is consistent
with a universal reduction of networking activities. Next we provide a nu-
merical example with this property.
Example. Let N = 2M;M ￿ 2, and ￿ = (I;E) be the circular undirected
graph with E = ff1;2g;f2;3g;:::;fN ￿ 1;Ng;fN;1gg. Put bij(si;sj) = 0
for fi;jg 62 E and bij(si;sj) = 1
2 ln(1 + si) ￿ln(1 + sj) for fi;jg 2 E.
Then the pairwise interactions exhibit weak strategic complements rather
26than strategic substitutes. Let e = exp(1) be the Euler number and set
K = f0;e1=4 ￿ 1;e ￿ 1g. With Ci = e￿1 for all i, we obtain a game G which
has two symmetric equilibria, s0 = (0;:::;0) and s￿ = (e￿1;:::;e￿1). Set-
ting C0
i = e￿1=4=4 < Ci for all i de￿nes a game G0 which has three symmetric
equilibria, s0, s￿, and s￿￿ = (e1=4 ￿ 1;:::;e1=4 ￿ 1). Thus, the example has
actually several interesting features. First, there exists the equilibrium s0,
an instance of mutual obstruction where nobody has an incentive to network
if nobody else is networking. Next there exists the equilibrium s￿ where ev-
erybody exerts maximum networking e￿ort. Further, a cost reduction leads
to the emergence of a third equilibrium, s￿￿ where everyone makes a positive
but less than maximal e￿ort. Regarding our original point, the conclusion
of Propositions 7 and 8 obviously need not hold if the strategic substitutes
assumption of the form (B) is violated. Finally, it turns out that with a
slight logit perturbation, the dynamics would stay most of the time in the
equilibrium s￿, which is the unique stochastically state of the evolutionary
model based on G or G0.
The example satis￿es assumptions (A) and (C). In addition, the games
G and G0 are symmetric. As a consequence of Proposition 1, G and G0 have
smallest and largest equilibria which are symmetric. s0 is the smallest equi-
librium and s￿ is the largest equilibrium in both games. Thus, the smallest
and the largest equilibrium prove immune to a cost reduction. This obser-
vation is consistent with the claim that in response to a cost decrease, the
smallest and the largest equilibrium will never decrease. Formally, we ob-
tain a weak monotonicity result by applying an earlier result of Milgrom and
Roberts (1990):
Proposition 9 Consider a family of networking games G￿ satisfying (A)
and (C) which di￿er in the marginal cost parameters ￿ = (C1;:::;CN) 2
I R
N
++. Then the smallest and the largest equilibrium of G￿ are non-increasing
functions of ￿.
proof. Endow the parameter space I R
N
++ with the reverse of its canonical
partial order, that is for ￿;￿0 2 I R
N
++, ￿ ￿ ￿0 if and only if ￿i ￿ ￿0
i for all
i. Then the payo￿ functions given by (1) satisfy condition (A5) of Milgrom
and Roberts (1990). (A) and (C) imply that each game G￿ is supermodular.
Hence by Theorem 6 of Milgrom and Roberts, the smallest and the largest
27equilibrium of G￿ are non-decreasing in ￿ with respect to the reverse canon-
ical partial order of I R
N
++. Therefore, the assertion holds with respect to the
canonical partial order of I R
N
++.
By Proposition 4, if in addition to satisfying (A) and (C), a networking
game is a potential game, then the set of stochastically stable states forms
a nonempty sublattice of the set of equilibrium points. As a consequence
of this added structure, there exist a smallest and a largest stochastically
stable state. Interestingly enough, the comparative statics ￿ a la Milgrom and
Roberts for supermodular games extend to the smallest and largest stochas-
tically stable state. We choose a more abstract formulation in this instance
than before. Let ￿ be a nonempty subset of some Euclidean space I Rn,
n 2 I N, with generic elements ￿, ￿
0, and #.
Proposition 10 Suppose that G￿ = (I;(Si)i2I;(u￿
i)i2I);￿ 2 ￿, is a col-
lection of games satisfying conditions (X1)-(X3), with respective potentials
P ￿;￿ 2 ￿. Further suppose that for each i 2 I and each s￿i 2 S￿i, the pay-
o￿ function u￿
i(si;s￿i) has increasing di￿erences in (si;￿) on Si ￿ ￿. Then
the largest (smallest) stochastically stable state for each game G￿ is weakly
increasing in ￿ on ￿.
proof. Pick any s;s0 2 S with s ￿ s0 and any ￿;# 2 ￿ with ￿ ￿ #.
De￿ne s(0);s(1);:::;s(N) 2 S as follows: s(0) = s, si(k) = s0
i for i;k 2 I,
i ￿ k, and si(k) = si for i;k 2 I, i > k. By construction, s(k) ￿ s(k + 1)
for k = 0;1;2;:::;N ￿ 1. Because G￿ and G# are potential games and the
payo￿ function of each player i has increasing di￿erences on Si ￿￿, it is the
case that s ￿ s0 and ￿ ￿ # implies

































#(s(i ￿ 1)) ￿ P
#(s(i))
￿
= P #(s) ￿ P #(s0):
28This means that P ￿(s) has increasing di￿erences in (s;￿) on S ￿￿. For each
￿ 2 ￿, P ￿(s) is supermodular in s on S by assertion (￿) of Proposition 4.
Then the correspondence S￿ : ￿ ! ! S; ￿ 7! argmaxs2S P ￿(s) is increasing7
in ￿ 2 ￿ by Theorem 2.8.1 of Topkis (1998).
Now consider ￿;￿0 2 ￿ with ￿ ￿ ￿0 and pick any s 2 S￿(￿) and s0 2 S￿(￿
0).
Because S￿(￿) ￿p S￿(￿
0), supSfs;s0g 2 S￿(￿) and infSfs;s0g 2 S￿(￿
0). Since
S￿(￿) and S￿(￿
0) are ￿nite sublattices of S, supS S￿(￿) and supS S￿(￿
0) are the
largest elements of S￿(￿) and S￿(￿
0) respectively. Then s0 ￿ supSfs;s
0g ￿
supS S￿(￿) and so supS S￿(￿) is an upper bound for S(￿
0). But supS S￿(￿
0)
is the least upper bound for S￿(￿
0), so supS S￿(￿
0) ￿ supS S￿(￿) as asserted.
By next comparing inf S S￿(￿) and infS S￿(￿
0), we reach a similar conclusion
for the smallest elements of S￿(￿) and S￿(￿
0), respectively. The proof is com-
plete.
For example, suppose that for some integer m > 1, ￿ = f1;2;:::;mg. More-
over, Si = ￿ for each i 2 I and u￿
i(s) = minf￿;s1;:::;sNg for all i 2 I;￿ 2
￿;s 2 S. Then the game has the potential P ￿(s) = minf￿;s1;:::;sNg. For
any ￿ 2 ￿, the smallest stochastically stable state is ( ￿;:::;￿) and the largest
stochastically stable state is (m;:::;m).
A second example is given by the case of downward compatibility in sub-
section 4D. Suppose c 2 I R++ and ci(k) = c￿k for all i 2 I, k 2 K. De￿ne ￿ =




for a given parameter ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ I R￿. Each payo￿ function u￿
i(si;s￿i) has in-
creasing di￿erences in (si;￿) on Si￿￿ for all i 2 I. Moreover, each game G￿
has a potential P ￿. Hence the hypothesis of the proposition is satis￿ed. Con-
sequently, the conclusion of the proposition holds. Indeed, we found that the
smallest stochastically stable state is s0 for ￿ ￿ ￿￿ and it is sT for ￿ > ￿￿.
The largest stochastically stable state is s0 for ￿ < ￿￿ and it is sT for ￿ ￿ ￿￿.
Note that the potential does not necessarily depend on ￿ even when each
payo￿ function does. For instance, suppose that Si = f1;:::;mg for each
7For all ￿;￿
0
2 ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿0 implies S￿(￿) ￿p S￿(￿
0
) where ￿p is the strong set order.
Precisely, S￿(￿) ￿p S￿(￿
0
) means that for each s 2 S￿(￿) and s0 2 S￿(￿
0
), supSfs;s0g 2
S￿(￿) and infSfs;s0g 2 S￿(￿
0
).
29i 2 I, ￿ ￿ I R+ and the payo￿ function is de￿ned by u￿
i(s) = mini2Ifsig + ￿
for all i 2 I;￿ 2 ￿;s 2 S. Then, for all ￿ 2 ￿, P ￿(s) = mini2Ifsig. Propo-
sition 10 still applies: the set of stochastically stable states is the singleton
set f(m;m;:::;m)g for each ￿ 2 ￿.
Further note that the pairwise bene￿t function bij(si;sj) = 1
2 ln(1 + si)￿
ln(1+sj) used in the ￿rst example of this section is just one from a rich family
of functions of the multiplicative separable form f(si)f(sj) and generaliza-
tions thereof, e.g., f(si)f(sj)+ g(si)g(sj) with f;g ￿ 0;f0;g0 ￿ 0;f00;g00 ￿ 0,
etc., which all present instances of increasing di￿erences.
6 Pairwise Asymmetry
Instances of variably attractive players have been touched upon in case 2B
and, with positive and negative attraction, in case 2C. They exhibit pairwise
asymmetries and, therefore, have been excluded from Section 4. Next we
revisit those two and other similar scenarios.
6A: Variably Attractive Players Reconsidered
In case 2B we have seen that the less attractive players may make all the
investments, if some players are more attractive than others. The unique
equilibrium was stochastically stable and there was under-investment. In
case 2C, a mix of players with positive and negative attraction caused over-
investment in the unique and stochastically stable equilibrium. In both cases,
pairwise bene￿ts were of the form (4) where ￿ij = B(si+sj) for some function
B : I R+ ! I R+, speci￿cally B(x) =
p
x and B(x) = x. What distinguishes
both cases from instances of pairwise symmetry is the existence of numbers
V1;:::;VN such that
(v) vij = Vj.
If the Vi di￿er, then (iv) is violated and, as a rule, the pairwise interaction
games Gij do not have symmetric potentials. Consequently, Propositions 6,
2, and 3 need not apply. In the sequel, we focus on a linear model which
allows a systematic inquiry. This linear model is essentially identical with
30the one developed and analyzed in subsection 4B, with the crucial exception
of condition (v):
Linear Model. We assume an undirected graph (I;E) such that
bij(si;sj) = (si +sj)￿Vj if fi;jg 2 E and bij(si;sj) = 0 if fi;jg 62
E. Like in 4B, we assume binary choices, K = f0;1g, and linear
costs, ci(si) = Ci￿si with Ci > 0 for all i.
Now let Ni be the set of player i’s neighbors and Zi = jNij be the number
of his neighbors. Since we always assume that nobody is isolated, Zi ￿ 1.
Further de￿ne Wi ￿
P
j2Ni Vj. Then si = 1 is a best response for i i￿ Wi ￿ Ci
and si = 0 is a best response for i i￿ Wi ￿ Ci. Moreover, G has the potential
P(s) =
P
i(Wi￿Ci)si. The social welfare function W assumes the particular
form W(s) =
P
i(Wi+ZiVi￿Ci)si. It follows that all equilibria are in weakly
dominant strategies and stochastically stable. In general, the maximizers of
P and W will not coincide. In fact, we know from 2B and 2C that with
variably attractive players, there can be under- or over-investment. Let us
add two more observations.
First, \bad neighbors" may not only harm \good neighbors", but can also
harm each other through their networking e￿orts. For example, let N = 4,
E = F, V1 = V2 = ￿1, V3 = V4 = 1, 0 < Ci < 1 for all i. Then the unique
equilibrium is s = (1;1;0;0) with utilities u1(s) = ￿C1;u2(s) = ￿C2 and
u3(s) = u4(s) = ￿2. Everybody would be better o￿ at s0 = (0;0;0;0). But
given any choices by 3 and 4, players 1 and 2 ￿nd themselves in a Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Incidentally, the e￿cient outcome would be t = (0;0;1;1) with
W(t) = 4￿(C3+C4). Hence, the equilibrium s which is in strictly dominant
strategies and stochastically stable, exhibits over-investment by 1 and 2 and
under-investment by 3 and 4.
Second, the game G has a potential, even though the games Gij do
not have symmetric potentials, thus violating the premise of Proposition
6. By the way, a game Gij does possess a potential ￿ij given by ￿ij(0;0)=
0;￿ij(0;1)=Vi; ￿ij(1;0)=Vj; ￿ij(1;1)=Vi + Vj. However, ￿ij is asymmetric
unless Vi = Vj.
6B: Adversity
In certain pairwise interactions, one party gains when the other loses and
vice versa. One can think of chess matches, instances of gambling, or mutual
31industrial espionage. This means that for such a pair of players ij, the game
Gij is a zero-sum game: bij(si;sj) = ￿bji(sj;si) for any pair of networking
levels (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K. If one assumes the functional form (4) and equal
intensities of interaction, that is (i), then such an adversarial interaction
amounts to vij = ￿vji. It turns out that if Gij is zero-sum, then existence of
a potential of Gij and supermodularity of Gij are equivalent.
Proposition 11 Suppose the game Gij is zero-sum. Then the following
properties are equivalent:
(￿) Gij has a potential.
(￿) There exist functions fij : K!I R and gij : K!I R such that bij(si;sj) =
fij(si) ￿ gij(sj), bji(sj;si) = gij(sj) ￿ fij(si) for all (si;sj) 2 K ￿ K.
(￿) Gij is supermodular.
proof. By Theorem 1 of Br^ anzei et al. (2003), (￿) and (￿) are equivalent.
The separation property (￿) implies increasing di￿erences (in fact constant
di￿erences) and, since K ￿ I R, supermodularity. Hence (￿) implies (￿). By
Theorem 4 of Br^ anzei et al. (2003), (￿) implies (￿).
If a zero-sum game Gij has a potential, then the function ￿ij(si;sj) =
fij(si) + gij(sj), with fij and gij as in (￿), is a potential. The potential is
asymmetric unless fij and gij are identical up to an additive constant. Hence,
in general, Proposition 6 will not apply. Nevertheless, if each basic game Gij










for s 2 S. Moreover, then each player i has a nonempty set Di of weakly
dominant strategies and S￿ = SN = D1 ￿ ::: ￿ DN. Essentially the same
conclusions hold if each basic game Gij is constant-sum and a potential game.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
Nonspeci￿c networking means that an individual’s networking e￿ort estab-
lishes or strengthens links to a multitude of people. The individual cannot
32single out speci￿c persons with whom she is going to form links. In the
simplest case, the individual has a binary choice, to network or not to net-
work. This particular case covers already a variety of interesting scenarios
and phenomena. It encompasses scenarios with di￿erential bene￿ts across
pairs of individuals, mutual versus non-mutual (positive or negative) a￿ni-
ties, leading for instance to second-order externalities such as the impact
of an enemy of an enemy or to the co-existence of under-investment and
over-investment in networking as exempli￿ed in Section 6. Often, however,
networking e￿orts are gradual and our model accommodates this possibility
as well. Beyond expanding the descriptive scope of the model, the availabil-
ity of several levels of networking e￿ort makes the question of Section 5 how
networking e￿orts respond to a change in networking costs much more in-
teresting. One conceivable generalization of our analysis, including the com-
parative statics, would assume multi-dimensional e￿ort choices, like choosing
software-hardware combinations.
Supermodularity and increasing di￿erences, utilized in some of our com-
parative statics, are cardinal properties. As Milgrom and Shannon (1994)
point out, comparative statics questions are inherently ordinal questions,
and the conditions on objective functions and constraints necessary for com-
parative statics conclusions should possibly be ordinal. Indeed, Milgrom and
Shannon (1994) ￿nd such ordinal conditions for monotone comparative stat-
ics. They introduce and study quasi-supermodular functions and functions
with the single crossing property. These functions generalize supermodular
functions and functions with increasing di￿erences and preserve the mono-
tonicity conclusion for parametric optimization problems. A list of a wide
variety of problems in economics and in noncooperative games presented by
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) makes a convincing case for the value added
of their ordinal extension of complementarity conditions. In view of these
results, one might ask whether Proposition 4 can be extended further by in-
voking such ordinal conditions. Precisely, if we assume that each bij satis￿es
the single crossing property on Si ￿ Sj, are we then able to show that the
potential P is quasi-supermodular on S? Unfortunately, one cannot draw
such a conclusion. The reason is that the generality of the single crossing
property has its drawbacks: Namely, in the proof of Proposition 4 we make
use of Corollary 2.6.1 in Topkis (1998) which states that for a function de-
￿ned on a ￿nite product of totally ordered sets, increasing di￿erences implies
33supermodularity. This crucial auxiliary result no longer holds when the sin-
gle crossing property is substituted for the increasing di￿erence property.
Shannon (1995, p. 220) demonstrates that the single crossing property in
each pair of variables does not imply quasi-supermodularity in all variables.
Proposition 10 establishes a weak monotonicity result on the set of stochas-
tically stable states. It states that the largest (smallest) stochastically stable
state at a lower parameter value is smaller than the largest (smallest) stochas-
tically stable state at a higher parameter value. But this result does not assert
that a given stochastically stable state at a lower parameter value is smaller
than any other stochastically stable state at a higher parameter value. In a
recent paper, Echenique and Sabarwal (2003, p. 309) give a condition on a
pair of parameters ￿;￿0 2 ￿;￿ ￿ ￿0, which implies sup SN(￿) ￿ inf SN(￿0)
for the two equilibrium sets SN(￿) and SN(￿0). Since S￿(￿) ￿ SN(￿) and
S￿(￿0) ￿ SN(￿0), their condition also implies sup S￿(￿) ￿ inf S￿(￿0).
A further alternative could make the set of available e￿orts a (one- or
multi-dimensional) interval or convex set and assume su￿cient di￿erentia-
bility of the cost and bene￿t functions. As Brueckner (2003) demonstrates in
the context of speci￿c networking, one arrives at some conclusions very ele-
gantly, if such a continuous model is highly symmetry, but does not get very
far otherwise. Most of our subcases and examples can be easily embedded
into a larger continuous model. But again, while this might produce some
eloquence and quickness of derivations in some cases, it would only render
the analysis more complicated in others. An added complication stems from
the fact that the concept of stochastic stability developed in the literature
so far (based on logit or other perturbations) and employed in the present
paper relies on a ￿nite state space.
The idea that the strength or probability of a link might depend on the
e￿orts of both agents involved, is also central to the model of Brueckner
(2003).8 Similarly, Haller and Sarangi (2003) consider the possibility that
the reliability of a link depends on the e￿orts of both agents. Since we
8After learning about our work in progress, Sudipta Sarangi pointed out to us Brueck-
ner’s paper and a further common trait of the two papers: Brueckner presents two asym-
metric examples, one with an agent who creates higher bene￿ts than others and a second
example with an agent who is more accessible than others.
34allow for negative a￿nity or attraction, some agents might not only abstain
from networking but might take counter-measures against the networking
attempts of others and be willing to incur costs in order to weaken or sever
links. This eventuality suggests a further extension of the formal model.
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